Abstract. The questions od determinism, causality, and freedom have been the main philosophical problems debated since the beginning of temporal logic. The issue of the logical value of sentences about the future was stated by Aristotle in the famous tomorrow sea-battle passage. The question has inspired Łukasiewicz's idea of many-valued logics and was a motive of A. N. Prior's considerations about the logic of tenses. In the scheme of temporal logic there are different solutions to the problem. In the paper we consider indeterministic temporal logic based on the idea of temporal worlds and the relation of accessibility between them.
Introduction
The logical questions that are raised when time is considered were already pointed by in his famous tomorrow's seabattle passage of De Interpretatione 9 19 a 30. This consideration led Aristotle to rejection of the principle of bivalence for assertions concerning the future. Diodorus Cronus from the Megarian school of philosophy stated a version of the problem in his notorious Master Argument. Some achievement in this subject is due to Avicenna (980-1037) . His work influenced the medieval logicians Albertus Magnus (1193/1206-1280) and William of Ockham (c. 1288 -c. 1348 ). In the 19th century Charles Sanders Peirce wrote that he did not share the common opinion that time is an extralogical matter. Jan Łukasiewicz (1878-1956) in debating questions of determinism considered arguments from the law of the excluded middle and from the principle of causality in that some logical problems of temporality were involved . Arthur Norman Prior (1914 -1969 , the founder of Kazimierz Trzęsicki temporal logic, was concerned with the philosophical matters of free will and predestination.
To use a formal logic to solve a philosophical problem, we have to have: 1. a formal language in that the problem can be formulated inan intuitively satisfactory way, 2. the logic of the language should be neutral with respect to this problem, i.e. the formulas that express the solution to the problem should not be theses of the logic (analytical truths of the language). The thesis of determinism as consisting of two theses, the thesis of predeterminism P RE-DET and the thesis of post-determinism P OST -DET , can be formulated as follows:
If at moment t it is true that α, then
[P RE-DET .] at any moment t 1 earlier than t, it was true that at t there would be α, and [P OST -DET .] at any moment t 1 later than t, it will be true that at t there was α.
The theses P RE-DET and P OST -DET are symmetrical with one another.
The principle of causality says: [P C.] If α occurs at t, then at t 1 , some moment earlier than t, and at any moment between t and t 1 , it was true that at t there will be α.
The principle of effectivity, as symmetrical to P C, may be formulated as follows:
[P E.] If α occurs at t, then at t 1 , some moment later than t, and at any moment between t and t 1 it will be true that at t there was α.
The principles P C and P E are mutually symmetrical to each other.
We are looking for a formal language such that: -both the theses P RE-DET and P OST -DET and both the principles P C and P E are expressible in it; -the theses as formulated in the language are not truths of the logic of this language, i.e. they are not true in any model, especially irrespectively of properties of time (though they could be true in some models and some classes of time);
Indeterministic temporal logic -the arguments from the principles P C and P E for P RE-DET and P OST -DET could be avoided even if both principles are valid. If all these conditions are fulfilled, we say that the logic is indeterministic.
Moreover, we are interested in such a solution that the most intuitive laws of temporal logic are preserved, i.e. laws that have some reason in the logic of natural language, e.g., are valid in the class of transitive times. In order to achieve these goals, not only certain properties of time will be supposed but also a relation of accessibility between different possible courses of events will be assumed.
Semantics

Temporal language
Let the language consist of: -p 1 , p 2 , . . .-propositional letters, -a functionally complete set of classical propositional connectives, -temporal operators (past tense and future tense operators). Let AP (atomic propositions) be the set of propositional letters. Formulas are defined in the usual way and will be denoted by Greek letters: φ, ψ, . . ., if necessary with indices.
Let time be T = T, < , where T is a non-empty set (of moments) and < is a binary relation on T (earlier-later). No property of < is supposed. W = T, <, V , where V : T → 2 AP , is a possible (temporal) world. V , valuation, is a function that to each point of T assigns a subset of AP , the set of propositional letters that are true at this point.
Prior defined temporal operators as follows:
T, <, V , t |= Gφ iff for any t 1 , t < t 1 : T, <, V , t 1 |= φ.
Definition 2.2 (F )
T, <, V , t |= F φ iff there is t 1 , t < t 1 : T, <, V , t 1 |= φ.
Definition 2.3 (H)
T, <, V , t |= Hφ iff for any t 1 , t 1 < t : T, <, V , t 1 |= φ.
Definition 2.4 (P )
T, <, V , t |= P φ iff there is t 1 , t 1 < t : T, <, V , t 1 |= φ.
Priorean temporal operators can be understood as a certain type of modal operators: G, H-as necessity operators, F, P -as possibility operators. The usual relations between necessity and possibility operators hold:
Let the Priorean language be denoted L P . Priorean language does not satisfy the conditions that are imposed on the language interesting us; namely, the thesis of determinism DET is true without any assumption about time: the formulas φ → HF φ, φ → GP φ are satisfied in any case independently of properties of time (<). They are theses of the minimal tense logic K t .
In the case of L P -if time is without an end-at least one of the sentences F φ or F ¬φ is true at any t (∈ T ). We are interested in such a logic in which it could be that both F φ as well as F ¬φ would not be true at some t (∈ T ). F φ, a proposition about the future, is true only if it is determined that φ will take place. Similarly, F φ is false only if it is determined that φ will not take the place. Such a situation is when φ will be true, or, respectively, false, independently of the course of future events. As Aristotle wrote in De Interpretatione, (http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/ interpretation/)
A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character. This is the case with regard to that which is not always existent or not always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather as we have indicated.
Indeterministic temporal logic
In branching time logic 'it will be φ' is determined iff on each branch at some moment in the future it will be φ: on each course of affairs, sooner or later, it will be the case that φ. This solution omits the important fact that φ is determined if φ occurs at the same moment independently of the branch, independently of possible courses of affairs.
Let temporal operators be defined assuming that there could be more courses of events though branches do not differ in time (as a set of moments).
Let I be a non-empty set. T, < × I is the class of times. On the class T, < × I a binary relation ⊳ of accessibility could be defined:
or formally equivalently:
It is reasonable to assume that between the relation of accessability, ⊳, and the relation "earlier-later", <, the following connections hold:
⋆ for any t, t 1 ∈ T ; i, j ∈ I:
By 1 ⊳ is reflexive. Condition 2, SY M M ⊳ , does not express symmetry of ⊳. It is weaker. E.g., it is not assumed that if (t, i)⊳(t 1 , j), then (t 1 , j)⊳(t, i).
Let V i : T → 2 AP , i ∈ I. T, <, ⊳, V i is a possible (temporal) world. In modal logic V (t) is a possible world. Now a possible world is understood as {V i (t) : t ∈ T }. In modal logic the accessibility of one world from another is a binary relation defined on T . Now ⊳, the relation of accessibility, takes into account not only a possible world (a course of events) but also a point of time, a constituent of the possible world.
Future and past tense operators will be defined with respect to a binary relation ⊳ of accessibility between possible worlds (possible courses of affairs). Let the same symbols of temporal operators as in the case of Priorean language will be used-in any case the context will determine the meaning of used symbol:
if (t, i)⊳(t, j) and t < t 1 , then T, <, ⊳, V j , t 1 |= φ.
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Definition 2.6 (F )
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= F φ iff there is t 1 ∈ T, t < t 1 such that:
Definition 2.7 (H)
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= Hφ iff for any t 1 ∈ T, j ∈ I:
if (t, j)⊳(t, i) and t 1 < t, then T, <, ⊳, V j , t 1 |= φ.
Definition 2.8 (P )
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= P φ iff there is t 1 ∈ T, t 1 < t such that:
Let L D be the language with temporal operators as defined by 2.5-2.8. Let us remark that in the case of one-element I, under the condition ⋆ that for any t, t 1 ∈ T, i ∈ I : (t, i)⊳(t 1 , i) iff t ≤ t 1 , all the definitions 2.5-2.8 collapse to 2.1-2.4, Priorean definitions of tense operators. It is also true if ⊳ is a relation such that: for any i, j ∈ I if i = j, then for no
Modal operators could be defined in the usual way.
Definition 2.9
there is j such that (t, i)⊳(t, j) and T, <, ⊳, V j , t |= φ.
The usual connection between and ♦ holds:
Let us remark that there is a difference between Priorean temporal operators preceded by and temporal operators as defined in L D . For example, F φ, as a formula of Priorean language, expresses inevitability: φ should be satisfied in a future moment of any accessible possible world, but F φ-as the formula of L D -is satisfied only if φ is satisfied at the same moment in the future in any accessible possible world. Hence F φ of L D better expresses the idea of determinism. The new temporal operators could not be redefined using Priorean temporal operators and . The language L D is not reducible to Priorean language with a modal operator.
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Satisfiability and definability Definition 2.10
T, <, ⊳, V i |= φ iff for any t ∈ T : T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= φ.
T, <, ⊳, V i |= φ means that the formula φ is satisfied by T, <, ⊳, V i , or that T, <, ⊳, V i is a model of φ. If T, <, ⊳, V i |= φ, we say that φ is omnitemporally valid in T, <, ⊳, V i .
Definition 2.11
T, <, ⊳ |= φ means that the formula φ is satisfied by T, <, ⊳ . Let F be a class of frames T, <, ⊳ .
Definition 2.12
F |= φ, a formula φ is satisfied by F, iff φ is satisfied by any member of F, i.e.
for any T, <, ⊳ ∈ F : T, <, ⊳ |= φ.
|= φ means that the formula φ is satisfied by any model that fulfills the condition ⋆.
Definition 2.13
A formula φ defines (characterizes) F iff:
Minimal logic
Let us consider some formulas of the language L D that are satisfied by any model (if ⋆ holds), i.e. all the formulas φ such that |= φ. Let the set of these formulas will be denoted
In the case of Priorean language, the set of formulas satisfied in any model is axiomatized. It is proved that the system K t , the system of minimal logic of the Priorean langauge, is valid and complete, i.e.:
The system K t is also decidable (McArthur, 1976) .
Let formulas of the discussed logics be taken purely formally, i.e. the differences in meanings of the temporal operators of the languages L P and the temporal operators of the language L D not be taken into consideration.
-in the case of one element set I all the definitions of temporal operators of the language L D collapse to Priorean language, -some formulas of language L D are not true for all frames even though they Priorean language counterparts are. M I(φ) is the mirror image of a formula φ iff it is the result of simultaneous replacing in φ all occurrences of G by H and F by P , and vice versa.
In the case of K t , the rule of M I holds, i.e.:
. It is also true in the case of K d (as the set of all valid formulas in any model).
Theorem 2.14 |= φ iff |= M I(φ).
Proof. Let > is the converse of < and is the converse of ⊳. Let us prove by induction that for any T, <, ⊳,
. A is true if no temporal operator occurs in φ. Let us suppose that A holds for ψ and χ. Let us only prove that A holds also in the case of Gψ, i.e. that for any T, <, ⊳, V i , t:
Let us consider only case 1. By definition of M I: M I(Gψ) is the formula HM I(ψ). Since T, >, , V i , t |= HM I(ψ) we have that for some t 1 , t 1 < t : T, >, , V i , t 1 |= M I(ψ). By inductive supposition:
T, <, ⊳, V i , t 1 |= ψ. It means that also T, <, ⊳, V i , t 1 |= Gψ, which contradicts assumption 1. Hence |= φ iff |= M I(φ).
The rule: M I. |= φ iff |= M I(φ) allows omitting the proof of |= M I(φ) if it is proved that |= φ and also if there is a counter-model for |= φ, then there is a counter-model for |= M I(φ). It means that if it is showed that |= φ, then the argumentation that |= M I(φ) can be omitted.
In the case of Priorean language the operators F and G are dual and the same is true for P and H. It means that:
In the language L D temporal operators are not dual. The logical connections between these operators are established by theorems 2.15-2.18.
Theorem 2.15
|= F φ → ¬G¬φ.
Proof. Let for some T, <, ⊳, V i , t be such that:
By definition of satisfiability
But it contradicts the assumption that
Theorem 2.16
|= ¬G¬p → F p.
Proof. Let a counter-model be constructed.
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Theorem 2.17 |= P φ → ¬H¬φ.
Theorem 2.18 |= ¬H¬p → P p.
Theorem 2.19
Proof. Let:
By the definition of satisfiability T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= Gφ and T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= Gψ. Hence there exist t 1 , j : (t, i)⊳(t, j) and t < t 1 such that
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is not true if there is no t 1 , t < t 1 , such that:
for any j ∈ I, if (t, i)⊳(t, j), then T, <, ⊳, V j , t 2 |= φ.
we have that
Thus we get a contradiction.
Theorem 2.21
|= H(φ → ψ) → (Hφ → Hψ).
Theorem 2.22
The following formulas are theses of minimal logic of Priorean language (McArthur, 1976, p. 22) :
In the language L D the logical connections between future and past temporal operators are established by theorems 2.23-2.26.
Theorem 2.23
|= p → HF p.
Proof. Let us construct a counter-model.
p is satisfied at (2, a), but HF p is not.
Theorem 2.24 |= P Gφ → φ.
Proof. Let T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= P Gφ. Hence there is t 1 , t 1 < t such that for any j ∈ I, if (t, i)⊳(t, j), then T, <, ⊳, V j , t 1 |= Gφ.
Thus for any t 2 , t 1 < t 2 and any l if (t 1 , l)⊳(t 1 , j), then T, <, ⊳, V l , t 2 |= φ.
Theorem 2.25 |= p → GP p.
Theorem 2.26 |= F Hφ → φ.
In the next theorems, connections between ¬G¬, ¬H¬ of the language L D and F , P of the Priorean language will be established.
Theorem 2.27
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= ¬G¬φ iff there are t 1 , t < t 1 , j ∈ I, (t, i)⊳(t, j) : T, <, ⊳, V j , t 1 |= φ.
Proof.
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= ¬G¬φ means that:
it is not true that T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= G¬φ.
It means that it is not true that for any t 2 , t < t 2 , l ∈ I:
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Thus equivalently there are t 1 , t < t 1 , j ∈ I, (t, i)⊳(t, j) such that:
Theorem 2.28
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= ¬H¬φ iff there are t 1 , t 1 < t, j ∈ I, (t 1 , j)⊳(t, i) : T, <, ⊳, V j , t 1 |= φ.
The theorems 2.27 and 2.28 say-roughly speaking-that the meanings of ¬G¬ and ¬H¬ of the language L D are the same as the meanings of the operators, respectively, F and P of Priorean language.
Let φ * be a formula obtained from φ by replacement of some its propositional letters by formulas of L D in such a way that:
1. replacement is simultaneous in any place in which the letter occurs. 2. the same letter is replaced by the same formula.
The above results justify the following:
Corollary 2.29
If φ is a formula in that as temporal operators only G and H occur and the Priorean language counterpart of φ is a thesis of the minimal logic K t , then: |= φ * , i.e. φ * is valid in any model.
For example, because the Priorean language counterpart of p → H¬G¬p is a thesis of K t , thus it is true that: |= ψ → H¬G¬ψ, where ψ is a formula of L D . But this could not be the case if F or P occur, e.g. though the Priorean language counterpart of p → HF p is a thesis of K t , it is not the case that |= p → HF p (th. 2.23). The difference between G, F and H, P , temporal operators of K d , is quite similar to that between intuitionistic general and existential quantifiers.
System K d
Axioms
Axiom 1
φ, if φ is a tautology of the classical propositional logic of the language
φ Gφ
RH. φ Hφ
The formulas 2-5 are distribution axioms. In K t the Priorean language counterparts of 4 and 5 are provable (McArthur, 1976, pp. 20-21) . Formulas 6 and 7 as expressions of L P are axioms of K t . The Priorean language counterparts of axioms 8 and 9 are provable in K t .
The rules RG and RH are temporal logic counterparts of the necessitation rule of modal logic.
The language L D could be enriched with , read: it is a fact, that (as defined earlier, def. 2.9). The language will be denoted L D :
We see the possibility of introducing as one of the main advantages of the considered model. "It is (now) a fact, that" is not redundant, i.e. φ and φ do not mean the same (if set I has at least two elements and the relation ⊳ is not empty). The formal difference between T, ⊳, <, V , t |= φ and T, ⊳, <, V , t |= φ can be interpreted as a difference between contingency and necessity. T, ⊳, <, V , t |= φ says that at t φ is contingent. T, ⊳, <, V , t |= φ says that at t φ is necessary. In (Aquinas, 1905) we read:
A contingent event differs from a necessary event in point of the way in which each is contained in its cause. A contingent event is so contained in its cause as that it either may not or may ensue there from: whereas a necessary event cannot but ensue from its cause. But as each of these events is in itself, the two do not differ in point of reality; and upon reality truth is founded. In a contingent event, considered as it is in itself, there is no question of being or not being, but only of being: although, looking to the future, a contingent event possibly may not come off. Σ ⊢ φ-means that φ is provable from the set of premises Σ. Σ ⊢ φ iff there is a finite sequence of formulas such that any element of it is a member of Σ or an axiom or is obtained by application of a rule to some preceding elements and which last element is φ.
K d ⊢ φ means that in the system K d φ is provable from the empty set of premisses.
The axiomatic system K t consists of L P language counterparts of axioms 1-3, 6-7 and all the rules MP, RG and RH. K t is consistent, valid, complete and decidable. The L P counterparts of additional axioms of K d are theorems of K t . Thus K d is consistent. The system K d is formally weaker than K t , because counterparts of some theorems of K t are not valid in the language L D , e.g. p → GP p, p → HF p.
The facts that: -all the axioms and rules of K t could be expressed by formulas in which as temporal operators only G and H occur, and that -all L P counterparts of these axioms and rules are axioms and rules of K d justify the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1
If K t ⊢ φ and in φ, only G and H occur as temporal operators, then The logic of language L D is based on logic K d . All the axioms and rules of K d as applied to language L D are valid. There are additional axioms of the form of axioms of system of modal logic, axioms expressing connections between and temporal operators, and an additional rule:
The question of relations between and temporal operators in general is omitted here.
Let T RAN S ⊳ be the class of frames such that:
The condition T RAN S ⊳ does not express the transitivity of ⊳. The condition is weaker. Let us remember that about ⊳ it is supposed that ⋆:
It is also true for the other temporal operators.
Theorem 3.4
T |= Hφ ↔ Hφ iff T ∈ T RAN S ⊳ .
Theorem 3.5
T |= P φ ↔ P φ iff T ∈ T RAN S ⊳ .
Principles of causality and effectivity
P E.
The principle of effecivity says that: 1. if at (t, i) occur φ, then at some t 1 , t < t 1 and for any j, (t, j)⊳(t, i), at (t 1 , j) there is an effect of φ, and 2. for any t 2 , t 1 < t 2 < t, at (t 2 , j) there is an effect of φ.
P C.
The principle of causality says that: 1. if at (t, i) occur φ, then at some t 1 , t 1 < t and for any j, (t, j)⊳(t, i), at (t 1 , j) there is a cause of φ, and 2. for any t 2 , t < t 2 < t 1 , at (t 2 , j) there is a cause of φ.
Let us remark that
is valid only if time is endless, i.e.
T ∞+ . For any t ∈ T there is t 1 , t 1 ∈ T : t < t 1 .
In Priorean language the endless time is characterized by: Gp → F p. The same is true about the L D counterpart of this formula.
Theorem 4.1
It has been proved (th. 2.15) that: F φ → ¬G¬φ, thus by syllogism:
• φ → P F φ.
is valid only if time does not have a beginning, i.e.
T ∞− . For any t ∈ T there is t 1 , t 1 ∈ T : t 1 < t.
In Priorean language time without a beginning is characterized by: Hp → P p. The same is true about L D counterpart of this formula.
Theorem 4.3
It has been proved (th. 2.17) that: P φ → ¬H¬φ, thus by syllogism:
Let T E be a class of frames T, <, I, ⊳ such that:
For any t and i there is t 1 , t < t 1 such that for any j, k:
Theorem 4.5
Proof. Let us prove only that
Since T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= p we have that for any j, (t, i)⊳(t, j):
By condition T E we have that there is t 1 , t < t 1 such that
Let T C be a class of frames T, <, I, ⊳ such that:
For any t and i there is t 1 , t 1 < t such that for any j, k:
Theorem 4.6
Let us introduce Hans Kamp's (1968) binary temporal operators S (since) and U (until). Let us remark that there are various ways of defining S and U in our semantics. The definitions should be such that in the case of an empty I, they collapse to Kamp's definitions.
Definition 4.7 (S)
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= S(φ, ψ) iff there is t 1 < t such that for any j: (t, j)⊳(t, i):
T, <, ⊳, V j , t 1 |= φ and for any t 2 , t 1 < t 2 < t : T, <, ⊳, V , t 2 |= ψ.
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Definition 4.8 (U)
T, <, ⊳, V i , t |= U (φ, ψ) iff there is t 1 > t such that for any j: (t, j)⊳(t, i):
T, <, ⊳, V j , t 1 |= φ and for any t 2 , t < t 2 < t 1 : T, <, ⊳, V , t 2 |= ψ.
L DK denotes the language L D enlarged by both the operators S and U .
In L DK P E can be expressed as:
P C can be expressed as:
Let us remark that:
Theorem 4.9 |= p → U (P p, P p).
We have:
Theorem 4.10 |= p → S(F p, F p).
Neither of the formulas P C and P E expresses the irreflexivity or the transitivity of time (<, relation "earlier later"), i.e. the validity of both does not depend on the irreflexivity or the transitivity of time.
No effect does take place at the same moment as its cause and no cause takes place at the same moment as its effect. This means that to better describe P E and P C a formula that characterizes irreflexivity should be used. It occurs that there is no such formula of L P (Gabbay, 1981) . Since in the case one element set I language L D collapses to Priorean language, no formula of this language could do it, either.
Since any effect of φ is the cause of an effect of the effect of φ and any cause of φ is an effect of the cause of a cause of φ a formula characterizing the transitivity of < should be added to description of both principles, effectivity and causality.
The transitivity of < is expressible in Priorean language by formulas (McArthur, 1976, p. 26) :
In K t the formulas are mutually inferable.
The question of a formula of our language that characterizes the class of transitive time remains open.
Let T RAN S < be a class of frames T such that:
if t < t 1 and t 1 < t 2 , then t < t 2 .
Theorem 4.11
Proof. Let us prove only that if
Let T = {1, 2, 3} and I = {a, b}, (2, a)⊳(2, b), p ∈ V a (2, a). Thus
Theorem 4.12
Both the principles of causality and effectivity are independent of one another. P C and P E do not exclude one another.
The thesis of determinism
In the discussed language, the thesis of post-determinism is expressible as:
The thesis of pre-determinism is expressible as:
φ → HF φ.
P OST -DET and P RE-DET are not valid (for all frames). The same argument as in the proof of theorem 4.9 can be used.
We ask, even if irreflexivity and transitivity is assumed, then -it is possible that P C is valid but P RE-DET is not, and -it is possible that P E is valid, but P OST -DET is not. Let T P E be the class of frames that is characterized by P E, and T P C be the class of frames characterized by P C. In order to show that P OST -DET is not a consequence of P E even if time is irreflexive and transitive we have to prove that P RE-DET is not valid in the class of irreflexive and transitive frames characterized by P E, i.e.:
Similarly, to prove that P RE-DET is not a consequence of P C it should be showed that:
The thesis of P OST -DET is usually accepted: everything that has been is unchangeable and eternal. For e.g. Augustine (2010, Book 26.5):
Sententia quippe qua dicimus aliquid fuisse, ideo vera est, quia illud de quo dicimus, iam non est. Hanc sententiam Deus falsam facere non potest, quia non est contrarius veritati.
The proposition asserting anything to be past is true when the thing no longer exists. God cannot make such a proposition false, because He cannot contradict the truth. (Augustine of Hippo, 2012) According to Thomas Aquinas (Qu. 25, art. 4):
Praeterita autem non fuisse, contradictionem implicat For the past not to have been implies a contradiction.
The fact that P OST -DET is usually accepted justifies the fact that the principle of effectivity is not the subject of usual investigations as it is in the case of the principle of causality.
We ask if it is logically possible that the thesis P OST -DET holds, but the thesis P RE-DET does not hold. In order to prove it we have to show that P RE-DET is not valid in the class of irreflexive and transitive frames characterized by P OST -DET The unchangeable past is questioned by Lukasiewicz. He points out a sort of symmetry between past and future: We should not treat the past differently from the future (1970b, p. 127). He rejects the Latin saying «facta infecta fieri non possunt» that is, what once has happened cannot become not happened. He observes (1970a, pp. 127-128) :
If the only part of the future that is now real is causally determined by the present instant, and if causal chains commencing in the future belong to the realm of possibility, then only those parts of the past are at present real which still continue to act by their effect today. Facts whose effects have disappeared altogether, and which even an omniscient mind could not infer from those now occurring, belong to the realm of possibility. One cannot say about them that they took place, but only that they were possible. It is well that it should be so. There are hard moments of suffering and still harder ones of guilt in everyone's life. We should be glad to be able to erase them not only from our memory but also from existence. We may believe that when all effects of those fateful moments are exhausted, even should that happen after our death, then their causes too will be effaced from the world of actuality and pass into the realm of possibility. Time calms our cares and brings us forgiveness.
Similarly Oscar Wilde (1998) believes that:
Of course the sinner must repent. But why? Simply because otherwise he would be unable to realise what he had done. The moment of repentance is the moment of initiation. More than that: it is the means by which one alters one's past. The Greeks thought that impossible. They often say in their Gnomic aphorisms, 'Even the Gods cannot alter the past.' Christ showed that the commonest sinner could do it, that it was the one thing he could do. Christ, had he been asked, would have said-I feel quite certain about itthat the moment the prodigal son fell on his knees and wept, he made his having wasted his substance with harlots, his swine-herding and hungering for the husks they ate, beautiful and holy moments in his life. It is difficult for most people to grasp the idea. I dare say one has to go to prison to understand it. If so, it may be worth while going to prison.
To show the logical possibility that both the thesis P RE-and P OST -DET do not hold though both the principles P C and P E are valid we have to prove that both the theses are not valid in the class of irreflexive and transitive frames characterized by both the principles P E and P C. 
